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First, I want to thank you: thank you all. What a joy and what
an honor. A joy and an honor because it is N.Y.U., because it is the
Annual Survey, because you have invited my beloved wife, my
daughter, and my son-in-law; but also because of the things that you
have said, and most especially because of who you are.
When I thought about who you are—all of the speakers—I no-
ticed one thing: in addition to the magnificent law work you have
all done—and that is central to what you do, what you have done—
is your willingness to engage in conversations, in dialogue with
others, to further the study, to further the development of the law,
to make it better, to push the quest further. In a way, it is not sur-
prising for academics to do that—that is what the academics today
represented and that is what academics are supposed to do.
But what is stunning is the diversity of the conversations which
each of the speakers has represented—whom they talk to, and so
elegantly. I’m going to stop and interrupt myself right there. The
Dean suggested that I might take a name, a position that required
me to take another name. And I was thinking as you were talking
about the possible names I might take: Ricky the First—no; Akhil
the First—a little better; Vincenzo the First—sounds good; Kenji
the First. I’ve decided that it was absolutely clear that if anything
like that happened, the name I should take is: Judith the First.
So, back to conversations. Akhil, who talks with historians and
even with the Framers; that is his conversation. Kenji, who talks with
literature and the greatest works of literature and the poets; one
never hears Kenji talk except in conversation with them. Ricky, who
talks with environmentalists and administrators. Ken, who talks with
economists and people who actually do insurance work—and that is
a very hard group to talk to, and yet he talks to them and they
listen. Vincenzo, who talks with lawmakers and expounders in cog-
nate countries and in non-cognate countries, and in that conversa-
tion pushes the quest further.
But it is equally true of the judges who spoke tonight. For these
are judges who understand that the role of judges is not only to
decide cases and occasionally to make law, but that it is also to be
part of an ongoing process of law development that comes about as
a result of judges dialoguing and structural conversations with
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ministrative agencies; with courts of other sovereign states; with fed-
eral courts of all levels; and with the academy. Think about Judith
for instance, and her decision on the New York death penalty, that
great decision, which was a dialogue with the legislature, a conversa-
tion with the legislature.1 Not to mention the development of certi-
fication, which is a dialogue between the federal courts and the
state courts in which the federal courts ask and learn while some-
times even suggesting, “Here is what we might know from some-
place else but it is up to you to tell us whether you want to accept it
or not.” Think about Bob Katzmann, and his work in immigration.
In talking about the development of that law and in creating that
bar, not to mention his direct writings about getting in touch with
Congress, with the legislature, when the decisions of the courts
have to be in one direction but don’t make sense, and so he asks
the legislature to cure that.
All this is crucially important to me because I am both an aca-
demic and a judge. And if there is anything that defines my work
and my judicial philosophy, it is the centrality of dialogue. This has
been, I hope, true of my scholarship, for example—and I hope not
only—with economics. And here I emphasize dialogue, not subser-
vience—not just applying economics to law, but a back and forth in
which each discipline gains from what the other can tell. It is not
economic analysis of law—it is law and economics talking to each
other.
Let me give just two very quick examples from The Cathedral.2
The Cathedral has a little model and it looks through that model at
the world as it is, and it says: “Gee, there are things that aren’t in
the world.” And then you realize, if you are dialoguing, it is because
we were looking at the world entirely from the standpoint of appel-
late cases, and not looking at the world in the way it really was. So
there, economics caused us to rethink the world in a way. But more
recently, I’ve been thinking of The Cathedral in a different way. I’ve
been thinking that most of us, myself included, when we started out
with that, talked about the liability rule as if it was there to mimic
the market—to do what the market should do if the market didn’t
work. But if you look at the real world—the world of punitive dam-
ages, of juries that are willing to do more than give compensation,
of juries that give less, of eminent domain (as in Kelo3), that some-
times ought to give more than market value compensation, or as in
1. People v. Smith, 468 N.E.2d 879 (N.Y. 1984).
2. Guido Calabresi & Alan Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalien-
ability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).





      03/04/2015   07:12:55
36095-nys_70-1 Sheet No. 26 Side A      03/04/2015   07:12:55
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYS\70-1\NYS109.txt unknown Seq: 3 24-FEB-15 11:28
2014] ACKNOWLEDGMENT 39
Italy where compensation is value in use, not market value—you see
that in fact the real world says that the liability rule can mimic ina-
lienability. All that comes from a conversation back and forth.
But I think it is equally important to my view of judging. Yes,
we decide cases and that’s the first thing we do; yes, occasionally we
make law directly, but much more often, we make law through re-
mands, suggestions, and comments to engage other lawmakers, law
developers, institutions in the task; we become part of the process.
This can be seen in certification, but it can also be seen in decisions
that send cases back to the legislatures for second looks. It can be
seen—whether directly or obliquely—in cases that turn on pruden-
tial rightness, and conversations of that sort. Decisions invoking the
European—Italian, originally—notion of laws heading towards con-
stitutional invalidity. It can be seen in concurring opinions in which
we talk; indeed, even when I write a concurrence with my own ma-
jority opinion, because I want to decide the case, but I also want to
write in ways that start talking beyond that. And of course, in deci-
sions that speak to the academy and draw from academic thought. I
don’t mean that dialogue is the only—or even the primary—role of
an American judge, but it is a crucial one. And it is one that an
academic judge is especially suited to engage in. It is both modest
and restrained in its immediate practical effects, but in a long-term
sense it can be very assertive. Moreover, it’s great fun. It’s great fun
to be doing that.
So there it is. I’ve given myself away. But in a sense, those you
chose to speak about me already have because they were all dia-
loguers—they are all dialoguers. And that is why I rejoice and am so
grateful for this evening.
JUDGE GUIDO CALABRESI
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
